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Abstract: Alexander R. Galloway and Jason R. LaRiviére’s article 
“Compression in Philosophy” seeks to pose François Laruelle’s en-
gagement with metaphysics against Bernard Stiegler’s epistemo-
logical rendering of idealism. Identifying Laruelle as the theorist 
of genericity, through which mankind and the world are identified 
through an index of “opacity,” the authors argue that Laruelle does 
away with all deleterious philosophical “data.” Laruelle’s generic 
immanence is posed against Stiegler’s process of retention and dis-
cretization, as Galloway and LaRiviére argue that Stiegler’s philos-
ophy seeks to reveal an enchanted natural world through the de-
velopment of noesis. By further developing Laruelle and Stiegler’s 
Marxian projects, I seek to demonstrate the limits of this vantage 
of “compression.” In turn, I also seek to create further bricolage be-
tween Laruelle and Stiegler while also further elaborating on their 
distinct engagement(s) with Marx, offering the mold of synthesis 
as an alternative to compression when considering Stiegler’s work 
on transindividuation. In turn, this paper seeks to survey some of 
the contemporary theorists drawing from Stiegler (Yuk Hui, Al-
exander Wilson and Daniel Ross) and Laruelle (Anne-Françoise 
Schmidt, Gilles Grelet, Ray Brassier, Katerina Kolozova, John Ó 
Maoilearca and Jonathan Fardy) to examine political discourse re-
garding the posthuman and non-human, with a particular interest 
in Kolozova’s unified theory of standard philosophy and Capital. 
Keywords: Laruelle, Stiegler, Deleuze, immanence, 
transcendental, idealism
Introduction to Non-Marxism
Within the nexus of contemporary philosophers who prioritize im-
manence - Giorgio Agamben, Jean-Luc Nancy, Tristan Garcia, Me-
hdi Belhaj Kacem, and Roberto Esposito - there remains a certain 
tendency to retain the univocity of Spinoza, often filtered through 
the Deleuzian aperture of generic multiplicity. Consequently, these 
contemporaneous philosophers articulate immanence vis-à-vis the 
individual modes of material and political life as expressions of the 
same substance. This metaphysical typology of abstraction can be 
traced back to German idealism’s emphasis on the relationship be-
tween cognition and deduction. Epitomized by Kant’s “transcenden-
tal decision,” or the ability to draw universal claims from particulars 
as the “engine” for ontogenesis, the transcendental configuration’s 
confluence between Identity and Difference is rooted in Plato’s 
breakage from Parmenides. Surveying the contemporary philo-
sophical topology, we see that even in Meillassoux’s arche-fossil sci-
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entific ontology - where matter can be traced back to a primordial 
ontological order that emphatically discards the necessity of Kan-
tian “correlationism” - the ahistorical reliance on mathematics as 
an empty sign results in a series of philosophical “blind spots,” with 
the most marked political predicament being a poverty towards the 
modes of production. In François Laruelle’s “non-standard” phil-
osophical method, however, we find something altogether more 
radical: an absolutely singular withdrawal from the metaphysical 
precept that separates the world into (often paradoxical) binarisms. 
Laruelle’s method altogether rejects Being, described by Heidegger 
as the foundation for philosophy’s “standard model” (Ereignis). In its 
univocity, Laruelle’s immanence of the “One” radicalizes Spinoza’s 
substance-monism of the mind; in turn, Laruelle’s non-standard 
philosophical method challenges the Kantian thesis, whereby mind 
is not a “mirror” of the world, but, instead, mediates and restruc-
tures the passage of phenomena vis-à-vis its own internal structure. 
For Laruelle, the “Real as One” precedes the philosophical decision, 
as the Real is foreclosed to epistemic access. Therefore, philosophy 
is aligned with both “fictionalization” and fractured synthesis, as it 
cannot adequately conceptualize the univocity of the superposition 
of the Real without dividing it along terms of intelligibility - Identity 
and Difference. Unlike the diffracted multiplicity of Deleuzian imma-
nence, within Laruelle’s plane of the Real, the “One,” immanent to it-
self, cannot be divided (into the “two,” or the riven relationship) - it is 
solely on the plane of the transcendental that the Real can be divisible.
The consequence of the Kantian transcendental decision, which 
Laruelle terms the Principle of Sufficient Philosophy, is that cog-
nition is directed by the noumenal Real, which is removed from 
any possibility of cognition. Thus, under Kant’s system - and those 
of neo-Kantians such as Carnap, Sellers, Gadamer, Heidegger, 
and Reichenbach - the “real world” is substantiated as “unattain-
able, unprovable, unpromisable.”1 It is through cognition that the 
Kantian transcendental exacts its cardinal reign upon empirical 
knowledge, thereby predetermining the conditions of possibility. 
Following Laruelle, however, there is an idealist ideology that be-
smirches the Philosophical Decision, as it seeks to discover that 
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, trans. by R. J. Hollindale (New York: Penguin Books, 
1977), 20.
which “is determinant of the Real”2 and, consequently, “halluci-
nates” material-idealist instantiations of the Real. Laruelle does 
not castigate the impulse of decisionism prima facie but, instead, 
uses non-philosophy to forward a pure decisionism that deters from 
making determinate distinctions regarding the uncovering of the 
Real. Thus, the “‘principle’ of non-Marxism is that theory contains 
an essential part of decisions, rightfully axiomatic (and) transcen-
dental ... determined-in-the-last-instance by the Real.”3 Laruelle’s 
non-Marxism is an affront to the economy of transcendence that 
begins with Plato’s Being (psychophysical/immaterial essence) and 
eidetic intelligibility (formal/material causation). Therefore, Laru-
elle’s Real is idempotent. In Introduction to Non-Marxism, Laruelle 
demonstrates how thought submits to the Real (while not trans-
forming it into a philosophical truth), describing how “capital in 
the totality of its philosophical functioning” produces an “eco-
nomico-philosophical mixture” that concentrates and binds tran-
scendence with “‘alienation.’”4 For Laruelle, “[t]hat which Marx 
denounces as fetishism after a, perhaps, incomplete analysis of phi-
losophy itself” can be projected “beyond the market,” for “there is 
an over-fetishism which is not specially ‘theological,’ but is that of 
the philosophical.”5 Drawing from Laruelle and further developing 
this position, philosopher Katerina Kolozova distinguishes the re-
lationship between standard philosophy and capital, as they both 
operate through the acquisitive domain of appropriating materials. 
This position, of a unified theory of Capital and standard philoso-
phy, was originally stoked by Gilles Grelet’s work on “Proletarian 
Gnosis”6 but truly formulated by Katerina Kolozova in particular 
(and, subsequently, adopted by Laruellean scholars such as Jona-
than Fardy). In Capitalism’s Holocaust of Animals (2019), Kolozova 
describes the practice of the totality of “philosophical functioning” 
- or “standard philosophy” - as homologous to the ethos of capital.
It is according to this account regarding the constitution of empir-
ical mastery that Laruelle’s Marxist verge reveals itself as a kind 
of “non-standard” critique, whereby non-philosophy is not mere-
2 François Laruelle, Introduction to Generic Sciences, trans. by Jeremy R. Smith (2019), 9.
3 François Laruelle, Introduction to Non-Marxism, trans. by Anthony Paul Smith (Minneapolis, 
Minnesota: Univocal, 2014), 85.
4 Ibid., 9.
5 Laruelle, Generic Sciences, 7.
6 Gilles Grelet, “Proletarian Gnosis,” trans. by Anthony Paul Smith, Angelaki: Journal of the Theo-
retical Humanities, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2014), 93-98. 
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ly directed towards the dominion of the transcendental decision’s 
relativization of the a priori, but, in turn, towards how philosophy 
has trans-historically constituted its own terms of capitalist alterity, 
“proper to mastery.”7 In comparison to traditional Marxism, Laruel-
le’s non-Marxist formulation is grounded by the principle of phys-
icality being independent from representations - therefore, “[t]he 
real is given in essentially passive experiences, and cannot ground 
a metaphysical and political activism or voluntarism [....] The real 
is not a vague instance, the jewel of ideology; it is ‘individual’ ex-
periences.”8 In Laruelle’s “non-Marxist” system, humanity is con-
ceived of as an “identity-in-the-last-instance,” and as “one amongst 
many,” through which the human becomes central, “as a category 
of contingency rather than an Absolute.”9 In response to philoso-
phy’s possessive acquisition of the Real via its ethics of decisionism, 
Laruelle’s ethico-political praxis emancipates raw materials and 
exchange-based economic practices from Standard Philosophy’s 
possessive domination. Thus, contra Meillassoux and other specula-
tive realists’ flat ontologizing (e.g., Ian Hamilton Grant’s generative 
program of emergence, whereby “speculation is entailed by natu-
ral productivity”),10 Laruelle’s system is radical specifically because 
it is fundamentally materialist and historical. Following Marx’s ma-
terialist formalism, within Laruelle’s “Non-Marxist triptych”11 we 
can visually map the identification of “[s]pecific causality in class 
struggle” with the “empirical world” and the “ontological existen-
tiality of terrestriality.”12 In turn, Laruelle emancipates Marx from 
Marxism, unconfounding man from the subject (anthropos) and, 
thereby, establishes a unilateralizing presupposition of generic-
ity. As we will further demonstrate by way of Katerina Kolozova 
and John Ó Maoilearca’s contemporaneous work on Laruelle, this 
proves to be a most promising non-Marxist position for further 
7 François Laruelle, Struggle and Utopia at the End Times of Philosophy, trans. by Drew S. Burk 
(Minneapolis, Minnesota: Univocal, 2012), 239.
8 François Laruelle, A Biography of Ordinary Man, trans. by Jessie Hock and Alex Dubilet (Cam-
bridge: Polity Press, 2019), 144.
9 Katerina Kolozova, Capitalism’s Holocaust of Animals: A Non-Marxist Critique of Capital, Philoso-
phy and Patriarchy (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019), 139.
10 Ian Hamilton Grant, “Presentation by Ian Hamilton Grant,” Collapse, Vol. III: Unknown Deleuze 
[+Speculative Realism], ed. Robin Mackay (Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2012), 343.
11 François Laruelle, Tetralogos: Un opéra de philosophies (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2019), 195. 
12 Anne-Françoise Schmid, “The Tryptychs of Non-Philosophy,” trans. by Joevenn Neo, paper 
presented at the conference “François Laruelle and Non-Standard Philosophy: The Path of 
Least Resistance” (Bruxelles: Maison des Sciences Humaines of the Université libre de Bruxelles, 
February 8-9, 2019).
establishing an alternative to not only anti-humanism but also 
posthumanist/transhumanist discourse, proffering the non-hu-
man as the “science of man more universal than all philosophy.”13
However, prior to this undertaking, I will further distinguish Laruelle’s 
utopian non-Marxism alongside Bernard Stiegler’s markedly commu-
nal and exchange-based project, which is carved along lines of epis-
temophilia and transindividuation. Rather than merely accentuate 
the distinction between the two philosophers, which I posit as pure-
ly methodological, I will seek to create propinquity between Stiegler 
and Laruelle by way of their political philosophies. With the exception 
of Alexander Galloway and Jason Lariviere’s work on “philosophical 
compression”14 - a project that seeks to set the two philosophers as 
entirely non-compliant - and a sentence in Ian James’ The Techniques 
of Thought,15 this endeavor has, hitherto, gone unendeavored. 
Bridging Laruelle and Stiegler
Stiegler’s engagement with the material conditions of contingen-
cy is related to the political embodiment of public powerlessness 
by way of the cosmological dimension of noesis, or the intellec-
tual faculty of imagining alternative material world-conditions 
13 François Laruelle, Théorie des étrangers: Science des hommes, démocratie, non-psychanalyse 
(Paris: Kimé, 1995), 110.
14 In Alexander Galloway and Jason Lariviere’s work on philosophical compression, the authors 
delineate two distinct forms of metaphysical compression: “abstract compression” and “generic 
compression.” They begin by examining the use of compression and decompression in media 
artefacts as it applies to informational richness or loss but seek to modify compression to 
examine how metaphysics recasts “philosophy as a kind of media theory.” They define “abstract 
compression,” which applies to Stiegler, as a philosophical position in which “compression is an 
undesirable by-product of the metaphysical contract.” Galloway and Lariviere describe “generic 
compression” as a “slightly different position in which compression is a positive tactic of mate-
rial indifference,” with Laruelle’s non-philosophy identified with “signal-processing,” whereby 
immanence eliminates all superfluous “philosophical data.” While both kinds of compression 
describe the deletion of “something, be it formal, material, auric, or essential,” both modes 
apply deletion to distinct registers. The authors further qualify that while “abstract compres-
sion” assumes that “real phenomena appear as selective deletions of a superlative nature,” 
“generic compression reveals the basic insufficiency and indistinction of the real phenomena of 
everyday life.” Throughout the paper, I retain this vantage of compression, with “decompres-
sion” understood as a reversal of this deletion/discretization process, but also challenge the 
eliminative terms of this model - chiefly that this description neither accounts for what becomes 
of “deleted” information nor for the generative or reproductive recursivity of the discretization 
process. See Jason Lariviere and Alexander Galloway, “Compression in Philosophy,” boundary 2, 
Vol. 44, No. 1 (2017), 127-28.
15 James states that “the image of philosophy that Stiegler presents also, as it does with Laruel-
le, implies a thorough rethinking of the conditions of knowledge and a concomitant questioning 
of the distribution and interrelation of different modes of knowledge.” See Ian James, The 
Techniques of Thought: Nancy, Laruelle, Malabou, and Stiegler after Naturalism (Minneapolis, 
Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2019), 42.
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as it relates to technics. In order to better understand Stiegler’s 
Marxism, which is explicitly concerned with today’s capitalist sub-
ject, we must historically situate it alongside a tripartite mold.
If, following the traditional Marxian framework, the subject (or “vic-
tim”) of the first form of capitalist “proletarianization” was the pro-
ducer then, in particular, it was epitomized by the industrial work-
er. If we consider virtualization as a topological configuration, then 
this moment was also accompanied by spatial privatization, as the 
means of work was configured via the factory, a “giant industrial 
‘workhouse,’” so disparate from other spaces of confluence that it 
was identified as a “House of Terror.”16 Distinguished by the Decade 
of Prosperity and post-World War II economic expansion, the sec-
ond epoch of proletarianization primarily concerned the consumer 
and, in particular, those members of the middle class who flocked 
to retail areas - “the department store and the supermarket, then 
the shopping center and the online retailer.”17 The third moment, 
of “generalized proletarianization,” colors today’s epoch and is 
characterized by mass propagation, the rise of the amateur’s un-
wittingly performed digital/immaterial cognitive labor and diffract-
ed spatio-geographical distinction, such that this labor seeps into 
all annals of everyday life. Following the “first moment” - railway 
networks/the steam engine - and the “second” - Taylor-Fordism, 
the oil and car industry - this “third industrial revolution” is, spe-
cifically, that of the financialization of society and debt, the rise of 
cognitive capitalism and the information economy, which is often 
termed post-Fordism. Unlike the first two moments, “generalized 
proletarianization” does not demonstrate any radical historical 
breakage, but, instead, is better defined by the hybridization with, 
and intensification of, the previous two socio-historical modes.
In his most recent work, Stiegler is particularly interested in digitality 
and “generalized proletarianization,” or immaterial cognitive labor 
- which he terms “psychopower” or “neuropower” - as it is often per-
formed on the internet, by way of metadata collection and self-an-
notating data aggregation by the “Internet of Things” (e.g., GPS 
tags, “smartwatches,” mobile phones, embedded home automa-
16 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1, trans. by Samuel Moore and Edward 
Aveling (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1999), 171.
17 Benoît Dillet, “Proletarianization, Deproletarianization, and the Rise of the Amateur,” bound-
ary 2, Vol. 44, No. 1 (2017), 86.
tion systems). This widening of materiality, whereby “generalized 
proletarianization” is induced by our asymptotic movement towards 
transhumanism, captures the bind of φιλία (philia) and savoir-faire 
(or “know-how”) under capitalism’s ludic conditioning. Thus, this is 
why Lariviere and Galloway regard Stiegler as the philosopher of 
“decompression” par excellence - Stiegler’s understanding of capi-
talism, today, is in terms of the informatic compression of thought, 
nature and technology, with Stiegler’s means of transcendence as 
determined through psychic individuation (decompression). This is 
cyclic, as the “decompression of consciousness through engage-
ment with mnemotechnical devices” finds itself followed by an 
aporetic “[e]xpansion via psychic individuation,” which “occurs, only 
to be reexteriorized, grammatized, and disindividuated again.”18
However, here, too, we see a bridge between Stiegler and Laruel-
le’s non-Marxism - in Laruelle’s non-Marxist system, the labor of 
the cognitariat falls within the domain of materialism, as “materi-
alism is a style of identity” incorporating that which is “sensible and 
intuitive without practice,” “practice without matter,” and “ma-
terial without form.”19 Standard philosophy is exploitive through 
the exchange-based economy of acquisition. Since non-Marxism 
relates to immaterial cognitive labor, it is perhaps most lucidly 
exemplified in the realm of art. As Jonathan Fardy demonstrates, 
there is a distinct intersection between Laruellian non-aesthet-
ics (which demonstrates how ethics, aesthetics, and philosophy 
is irreducible to any one of these categories) and non-Marxism 
via the labor of art. With “standard aesthetics” we see how art 
appropriates and extracts a “surplus value” in “the form of an in-
crease in the cultural capital of standard philosophy.”20 The labor 
of art - its sensuous and intellectual (immaterial) work - is exploit-
ed when it is turned into a subject of philosophy, which is diffract-
ed, or “generalized,” through the art-object’s cultural reticulation, 
exacerbated by online circuits, whereby this perceptual-cogni-
tive labor is generalized. Consequently, we can see how Stiegler’s 
“generalized proletarianization” is undoubtedly concerned with 
the very same notion of philosophically-determined labor that 
is the object of Laruelle’s non-Marxist conception of materiality. 
18 Lariviere and Galloway, “Compression,” 128-29.
19 Laruelle, Non-Marxism, 114.
20 Jonathan Fardy, Laruelle and Art: The Aesthetics of Non-Philosophy (London: Bloomsbury, 
2019), 95.
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As Stiegler examines “generalization” as a consequence of be-
coming-subject vis-à-vis digitality, Kolozova and other Laruellian 
scholars’ unified theory of philosophy and Capital is similarly con-
cerned with “generalization.” Ray Brassier associates Laruelle’s 
“generalization” with the “radicalization” of entity and unity, or 
the “de-objectification” and “de-phenomenologization” of the sin-
gular through non-thetic universality. This allows for Laruelle to 
effect a “transcendental universalization of materialism,” sever-
ing the idealist presumption of a link between entity and unity - 
whether it be phonological, apperceptive, apophantic or apophat-
ic - by underdetermining empiricity.21 Thus, Stiegler and Laruelle 
both arrive at an immanently theoretical mode of phenomenality. 
Stiegler and Geistig: The Transdividual Considered
As we closely examined Laruelle’s non-philosophy and non-Marxism, 
let us, similarly, meticulously analyze Stiegler’s work on transdividua-
tion and its metaphysical suppositions. While Lariviere and Galloway 
use Stiegler’s work to demonstrate “compression” and “decompres-
sion” as “two ways of defining representation,”22 they systematize 
Stiegler’s process - between dividuation and individuation - as cyclic 
and exchange-driven. However, we can use synthesis as an alter-
native model to describe the recursive materialization of memory 
and material habit - which is socialized - as the integral element that 
eludes Lariviere and Galloway’s critique. For Stiegler, material habit 
is a critical formation informing nature and all biological living sys-
tems but, also, some nonliving artefactual/technical systems that 
have a prosthetic relationship with organicity. This is why, according 
to Stiegler (though most clearly articulated by his protégée, Alex-
ander Wilson), “material habit formation… is already protomnemo-
technical.”23 Following this functionalist and materialist account, 
habituation is what constitutes our experience of temporality as the 
accumulation and exteriorization of knowledge, with “knowledge” 
understood as the pre-exteriorized characteristic of technology.24 
21 Ray Brassier, “Behold the Non-Rabbit: Kant, Quine, Laruelle,” Pli: The Warwick Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol. 12 (2001), 52.
22 Lariviere and Galloway, “Compression,” 127.
23 Alexander Wilson, Aesthesis and Perceptronium: On the Entanglement of Sensation, Cognition, 
and Matter (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2019), 151. 
24 This is, also, quite similar to the position posed by Donna Haraway’s oft-paraphrased claim 
that we have always been cyborgs, as materiality cannot be apportioned from the automaton 
of sense-production and signification. In a recent interview with Hari Kunzru, Haraway specified 
 Drawing from Deleuze’s “control society,”25 for Stiegler our epochal 
turn towards “dividuation” reduces the subject to data-capture, or 
total datafication, resulting in the ruination of both identity and col-
lective bonds. Conceiving of a new era of “hyper-control,” Stiegler 
has coined “psychopower,” or “neuropower,” as a more subtle and 
severe form of operational control than biopower, as it results in the 
destruction of libidinal energy alongside psychic and collective bonds. 
The “dividual” allots for projective derivation and, thus, introduces 
non-arbitrary subsidiary interpolation, consequently instrumental-
ized for extrapolation.26 In contrast to “dividuation,” “individuation” 
is normatively positive as it permits for the discovery of subjectivi-
ty through collective bonds and contributory politics.27 For Stiegler, 
within our digital milieu, the possibility of collective individuation, or 
transindividuation, is formalized by the participatory horizon of exis-
tential protentional thought via creative constraints: with a marked 
interest in epistemophilia and the commons, Stiegler poses that 
certain kinds of technologically-directed “confrontations” can be 
hermeneutically staged, as it is φιλία that prompts the unconscious 
process of “becoming-produced” through assemblages and circuits. 
Qua Simondon, Stiegler’s transindividual is psychosocial, for it is 
within our technical-artefactual “reality that the individuated be-
ing transports with him, this charge of being for future individua-
tions.”28 Transindividual memory transits across individuals and 
that we have not always been cyborgs, however, and that this is, in fact, historically situated: 
“the cyborg is not about all possible relationships between humans and technology - it is in fact 
a very specifically historically located figure and practice and embodiment and form of hybridity 
between human beings and other kinds of actors, both machinic and animal and each other.” 
However, as Katerina Kolozova demonstrates, and through both Stiegler and Laruelle, we can 
better illuminate how the issue of materiality and unification can still be understood trans-his-
torically while emphasizing that these conditions have been exacerbated through industrializa-
tion. See Hari Kunzru, “Donna Haraway Interview Transcript (1996),” Hari Kunzru’s Website (May 
14, 2009). www.harikunzru.com/donna-haraway-interview-transcript-1996; see also Kolozova, 
Holocaust of Animals, 70.
25 Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” in Negotiations 1972-1990, trans. by 
Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 177-82.
26 As metadata is collected, it is structured into a ternate model: descriptive (keywords), struc-
tural (content) and administrative (file type/creation date). Metadata subtly determines one’s 
online profiling, marketing, search engine optimization, and dynamically structured content, 
retrofitting a purposive world view.
27 “The heart of the contributory economy... also becomes the condition of transindividuation as 
the realization of a political noesis - establishing a new epoch of political debate, giving rise to 
the emergence of new psychosocial individuations of citizenship and defining new democratic 
and republican rules and laws.” Bernard Stiegler, The Age of Disruption: Technology and Madness 
in Computational Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019), 195.
28 David Scott, Gilbert Simondon’s Psychic and Collective Individuation: A Critical Introduction and 
Guide (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Pres, 2014), 139.
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generations, engaging within the cross-generational social sphere 
of protosocial non-verbal encoding: it is this synthesis and its rela-
tionship with the transduction between the subject’s elementary 
“vital” force and the collective that can serve as an alternative to 
Lariviere and Galloway’s “decompression.” While Lariviere and Gal-
loway describe how Stiegler’s conception of ludic capitalism, “in 
its current ‘cognitive’ or ‘informatic’ iteration, has compressed life 
itself in a way that is extremely lossy,”29 the aperture of synthesis 
provides for the unity of both loss and generation as not simply cy-
clic but, instead, also oriented alongside a historical continuum, dis-
enthralling the experiencing subject from epistemic access to the 
full circuitry of their technical reality. While conceding to the Hege-
lian influence of reflexivity, through this vantage of Stiegler we can 
postulate the trans-historical processes of technicity in tandem with 
alienation - we have always been cyborgs, albeit not always phe-
nomenologically aware of it, as we previously considered ourselves 
more “in control” of our cyborg-ization. Stiegler’s is an analysis of 
metaphysical interaction as it applies to the “concrete-abstract” 
conjugation defined by materiality as it is relationally conceived; 
Stiegler confronts what Brassier terms the challenge for materi-
alism, by acknowledging the reality of abstraction (via technics) 
without conceding to the idealism that reality possesses “irreducible 
conceptual form.”30 It is not that reality takes the form of technical 
artefacts - Stiegler’s materialism does not hypostatize a particu-
lar formal constitution of reality - but instead that the artefactu-
ally-bound process of technesis gives a description of labor’s sub-
sumption through the logicization of social reality by value-form. 
Lariviere and Galloway’s alternative model, the exchange between 
“compression” and “decompression,” neglects the development 
of infinitude that informs the entirety of Stiegler’s work on tran-
sindividuation, as it identifies proletarianization with a process of 
de-grammatization whereby φιλία and savoir-faire are neatly extri-
cated, rather than further subsumed and synthesized within the cir-
cuit(s) of automatization that constitutes our post-biological “sur-
plus of life.”31 Stiegler’s Marxian stance is an objective critique that 
29 Lariviere and Galloway, “Compression,” 131.
30 Ray Brassier, “Wandering Abstraction,” Mute (February 13, 2014). www.metamute.org/editori-
al/articles/wandering-abstraction.
31 Stiegler’s synthesis is more akin to Marx than Hegel, as, denuded of spiritual negation, 
technical life bears a constitutive “surplus” that extends beyond biological or teleologically-de-
operates in advancing what Hegel saw as the exteriorization of the 
Spirit through geistig,32 which amounts to an “exo-psychic discern-
ment”33 of discrete material elements. As Stiegler notes, he modu-
lates Hegel’s system by introducing an indissoluble play - “elements 
are discretized through the exteriorization and reproduction of liv-
ing flows that is grammatization - whether of bodily movements, 
gestures, speech, images, calculations or dreams.”34 The imperish-
able endurance of these vestiges indicates something quite dis-
tinct from “individuation understood as an uncompressed process 
of becoming”35 because it also deals with their socialized synthesis.
 Further related to Hegel’s grand synthesis of absolute knowledge 
under world spirit is Stiegler’s concept of noetic dreaming, or the 
inspiration of the intellectual imagination that cannot be realized 
materially but subsists as an idea (and “[i]t is for that reason that 
it is a dream”).36 We can consolidate Stiegler’s nexus of “anti-en-
tropy” - or, as it is ecologically structured, “the Neganthropocene” 
- as the ideal index of pure becoming in Hegel’s pragmatic “world 
spirit” (weltgeist), which serves as a sociohistorical asymptote. Con-
sequently, we see how Stiegler’s conception of technics engages 
with Hegelian synthesis by countering entropic loss through idealist 
becoming - negentropy is articulated through shared potentiality. 
Proceeding after philosophers of technology and general organol-
ogy (such as Ernst Kapp and Georges Canguilhem), Stiegler identi-
fies exosomatization (or the externalization of noesis) with Hegel: 
As Hegel taught in the nineteenth century - at the 
moment when exosomatization suddenly accel-
erated into machinic becoming (the first steam 
termined ends but, also, circumvents the fallacy of Kant’s noumenon (whereby there exists 
some radical “outsidedness” that cannot be recounted, as it is made artefactually manifest in 
Stiegler’s system).
32 In place of “geistig,” Stiegler uses noesis and trans-individuation to account for a functionalist 
and deprivatized account of mind; Stiegler’s logic of externalization vis-à-vis technological 
supplement is based on synthesis with the World through socialization. Thus, Stiegler’s iden-
tification of socialization with noesis maps on quite adeptly to Reza Negarestani’s neo-ratio-
nalist account of Intelligence as socialized geistig. See Reza Negarestani, Intelligence and Spirit 
(Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2019).
33 Stiegler, The Age of Disruption, 240.
34 Ibid.
35 Lariviere and Galloway, “Compression,” 131.
36 Bernard Stiegler, The Automatic Society 1: The Future of Work, trans. by Daniel Ross (Cam-
bridge: Polity, 2016), 427.
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engine arriving in Berlin in 1795), thereby inaugu-
rating the Anthropocene era - the life of the mind 
is the life of its exteriorization. Through exterior-
ization, the mind enters into a contradiction with 
itself that Hegel believed to be dialectical, lead-
ing to the great synthesis of absolute knowledge 
through which it would regain peace with itself.37
If Schelling’s Naturphilosophie is a precursor to biological organi-
cism, as Yuk Hui demonstrates,38 Hegel’s determinate logic of be-
coming anticipates the machinic organicism of cybernetics - second 
order cybernetics to be specific. For Hegel, nature is an “object of 
observing reason from the outset,”39 whereas for Schelling, na-
ture is pre-consciously sensed and detected prior to becoming an 
object of reflection. Unlike Schelling’s emphasis on an external 
force’s giving form to nature’s production, Hegel’s departure from 
preformation towards immanent negativity re-introduces contin-
gency into the system of nature. We can map this onto second-or-
der cybernetics quite neatly as, for Hegel, there are two forms of 
contingency: 1) chaotic nature; 2) the logical category (of being). 
Following Stiegler, after the introducing of the steam engine, cap-
italism has become associated with revealing the materially trans-
gressive principles of containment vis-à-vis technical archaeology, 
with automatization fomenting a process of growing anti-social 
disinhibition (or “disruption”). As Hegel’s synthesis demonstrates 
the collapse of determinate distinctions between the negative 
whole and the Absolute, in this early moment of industrialization 
we find both forms of contingency involved in mutually entangled 
self-regulatory feedback qua nature. Following Stiegler, such pro-
cesses of “trans-dividuation” are heightened by today’s predictive 
processing algorithms that incorporate continuous computation 
and automatization vis-à-vis their neuro-inferential schema, as 
in the case of elastic graph-bunching facial recognition technolo-
gies (and other biometrics) as well as the outpouching of actuari-
al finance to High Frequency Trading (HFT) with AI. Drawing from 
Marx, Stiegler identifies the historical effectiveness of relations of 
37 Stiegler, The Age of Disruption, 122.
38 Yuk Hui, Recursivity and Contingency (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2019).
39 Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik, Hegel in der Kritik zwischen Schelling und Marx (Frankfurt am 
Main: Peter Lang, 2014), 138.
production with the infrastructural-causal model of superstructural 
relations, whereby the latter can be considered within the terrain 
of probabilistic “calculation(s)”40 that disrupt transindividuation. 
According to Stiegler, it is through the “science of technics” that 
capitalism is able to fundamentally damage the phenomenological 
vitality expressed as noetic dreaming, or “lived immanence.”41 While 
Stiegler makes no explicit reference to noumena, or the “thing-in-
itself,” his engagement with disruption evinces “the reality princi-
ple,” or the constitution of the real. For Stiegler, disruption “sets 
the real outside the law [loi] by realizing the real beyond any right 
[droit] - through the creation of legal vacuums, which amount... to 
a de-realization of reality that leads to entropic decomposition.”42 
For Stiegler, the cerebral materiality that produces noetic activity 
is beyond full epistemic access, but our ontological conditioning 
reveals how it is artefactually mediated and processually unfolds. 
Unlike the quantum superposition of Laruelle’s Real, for Stiegler 
the real (which is dynamic, as with Hegel’s world-spirit) is identi-
fied with its effects - particularly those meta-empirical artefactual 
traces produced between the noetic activity of consciousness and 
the retentional phenomenology of material immanence. As such, 
the exo-somatic artefacts of Capital bear the brunt of synthesiz-
ing technization with ontogenesis. Thus, Ian James befittingly 
terms Stiegler’s Simondonian system “organological naturalism.”43
For Stiegler, in order to uncover the socially constitutive role played 
by originary technics is to pose the question of technologically-me-
diated access to knowledge. Here, Ian James makes a shrewd con-
nection between Stiegler and Laruelle: “[i]n this context, the image 
of philosophy that Stiegler presents also, as it does with Laruelle, 
implies a thorough rethinking of the conditions of knowledge and a 
concomitant questioning.”44 Having now distinguished both Stiegler 
and Laruelle’s ethico-political Marxist approaches and identified 
the Hegelian roots of Stiegler’s system, let us return to Laruelle’s 
non-philosophy. Moving forward, we shall further analyze Laruel-
le’s non-Marxism through a historical frame, forming linkages and 
distinctions with Stiegler’s account of lived material immanence as 
40 Stiegler. The Age of Disruption, 202.
41 James, The Techniques of Thought, 217.
42 Stiegler, The Age of Disruption, 292.
43 James, Techniques of Thought, 212.
44 Ibid., 42.
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they appear. With this methodology in mind, we will consequently 
cull two contemporary Laruellian philosophers who have engaged 
with both non-Marxism and the issue of the post-human: Kater-
ina Kolozova and John Ó Maoilearca. As much of Stiegler’s recent 
literature problematizes posthumanism, transhumanism and the 
accelerationist project (particularly that of Nick Srnicek and Alex 
Williams), this will probe distinct inquiries, while further scrutinizing 
the methodological fulcrum of compression and decompression.
Superposition and the Real-as-Artefact
[N]on-philosophy has two aspects. On the one 
hand, it reduces philosophy to a state of whatev-
er material; on the other hand, it announces new 
positive rules (which are non-philosophical but 
deduced from vision-in-One) of the labor of this 
material. By presenting these rules without yet 
founding them, we are giving a very succinct and ele-
mentary idea of their founding, which is vision-in-One.45
Seeking to overcome the problems of metaphysics and empiri-
cism, Kant’s transcendental critique, as developed in The Critique 
of Pure Reason, seeks to evince how all “objects must conform to 
our cognition.”46 With one swift move, Laruelle’s univocal imma-
nence superimposes the Kantian analytic a priori as noumenon. 
Termed “the Real as One,” Laruelle’s thesis of the Real is “de-
terminant-in-the-last-instance,” and, consequently, everything 
proceeds irreversibly from the a priori of the Real. This is a radical 
move as, even in the case of Deleuzian immanence, we can no-
tice a tendency to reserve “difference” as an immanent noumenon 
that legitimizes the phenomenon of diversity and heterogenesis. 
Laruelle’s superposition of identity with commonality reverses the 
classical metaphysical lineage that runs from Plato to Badiou, where 
the transcendental is upheld as a necessary precondition for ground-
ing reality. Instead, Laruelle deprioritizes prioritization and asserts 
the “One” as an axiomatic. If philosophy has always used difference 
45 François Laruelle, Philosophy and Non-Philosophy, trans. by Taylor Adkins (Minneapolis, 
Minnesota: Univocal, 2013), 11
46 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by John Miller Dow Meiklejohn (Mineola, New York: Dover 
Publications, 2016) 21.
and dualities as its fulcrum, Laruelle’s determination-in-the-last-in-
stance (DLI) allows for us to liberate the Real (which is identified 
with the One) from how it has historically been determined vis-à-vis 
being. As a theory of “minimal causation,” the DLI signifies Laru-
elle’s conviction that, although we are denied epistemic access to 
the Real, it is determinant of every instance and every thought im-
manent to it. Consequently, the Real is causal in the last instance 
but there is no way to trace this “last instance” back to its source 
- the Real - “for the Real cannot be grasped in terms of what it is.”47 
In Introduction to Non-Marxism, Laruelle traces the DLI before Al-
thusser, as it was “invented by Marx and Engels for historical ma-
terialism,” while problematizing that Marx and Engels “did not 
give us the adequate conception of it, capable of producing all the 
simultaneously theoretical and critical effects possible for it.”48 In 
turn, Laruelle modifies the DLI in order to make its “Marxist forms 
appear as simple symptoms or models of a more radical concept 
of causality.”49 Laruelle’s conception of the Real is (over)determi-
nant “in the last instance” because it simply cannot be reduced to 
a philosophical determination (idealism, rationalism, materialism, 
etc.) or structure (historical, economic, and so on), yet it contains 
all such “effects” of the Real. However, as Jonathan Fardy notes, 
Laruelle is somewhat indebted to Althusser’s theory of “symptom-
atic reading,” as Laruelle argues that “philosophy symptomatically 
reduces the Real to an object that stands outside a subject,”50 as the 
philosophical decision determines what is determinant of the Real.
Laruelle terms his non-philosophical foundation as a “matrix”51 out-
stripped of representational functions, as in the case of visual art, 
which functions as a metonymic index of visuality and perception. 
Detaching materiality from metaphoricity, Laruelle’s engagement 
with perception is not directed by moving through appearance, or 
representation, but, instead, testing how perception is, in fact, a 
“mathematical mode of organization and a presentation of the data” 
that occurs through superpositioning “at least two heterogeneous, 
47 Fardy, Laruelle and Art, 12.
48 Laruelle, Introduction to Non-Marxism, 41.
49 Ibid.
50 Fardy, Laruelle and Art, 146.
51 François Laruelle, Photo-Fiction, A Non-Standard Aesthetics, trans. by Drew S. Burk (Minneapo-
lis, Minnesota: Univocal, 2012), 4.
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conceptual, and artistic data.”52 Superpositioning is critical to under-
standing Laruelle’s Real, which is directly informed by quantum me-
chanics, and, most pointedly, from the Copenhagen Interpretation of 
quantum behavior where observation, termed the “observer-effect,” 
resolves the indeterminacy of atomic systems. Laruelle’s “idempo-
tent operation,” or the principle of superposition, “produces the 
same result no matter how many times the original application.”53 
This is not to say that the generic frontier precludes heterogeneity 
(in fact, quite the opposite) but, instead, to avoid lapsing into prob-
lems that accompany what Nancy Cartwright, in her description of 
nomological machines, terms the “frame of theory.” According to 
Cartwright’s nomological machinery, laws are not all-encompassing 
structures of order and regularity (conforming to a “super-science”) 
but, instead, exhibit themselves under certain conditions; according-
ly, there are suppositions that elude testability. In conformity with 
Laruelle’s Real, Cartwright remarks that “[r]eally powerful explanato-
ry laws of the sort found in theoretical physics do not state the truth.”54 
As a philosopher of science who mends Cartwright’s work on nomo-
logical machines with Laruelle’s non-philosophy, Anne-Françoise 
Schmid’s work on modeling also demonstrates how nonhierarchical 
heterogeneity and the disciplinary multiplicity of modeling are both 
placed in relation to and rendered contingent on Laruelle’s Real.
Laruelle introduces the term “philo-fiction” into his system, con-
tending there is no way to study both atomic behavior and, in turn, 
the world without changing it in a non-trivial manner (or “philoso-
phizing”). Thus, Laruelle opens the philosophical tableau to a kind 
of “gnostic vision.” As Fardy remarks, “gnostic vision” is comparable 
to the mystic’s vision, for it is neither true nor false but is “fictive 
for it envisions ‘another knowledge’ that cannot be assimilated by 
the frameworks of philosophical argument or scientific proof.”55 
Thus, Laruelle’s “non-standard philosophy” accepts the impossibil-
ity of coming to terms with the full scope of the Real while offering 
a terrain of “irreducible” phenomenal content, where “determina-
52 Ibid.
53 François Laruelle, “A Science of [en] Christ,” trans. by Aaron Riches, Angelaki: Journal of the 
Theoretical Humanities, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2014), 28.
54 Nancy Cartwright, How the Laws of Physics Lie (Oxford and New York: Clarendon Press, 1983), 
3.
55 Fardy, Laruelle and Art, 88.
tion in the last instance” serves as the “specific individual causality 
of the One.”56 Unlike Kant’s juridico-rational deduction, Laruelle’s 
“immediate givens” are simultaneously unreflective while fastened 
to transcendental experience: they are not intuitions, which are by 
definition always objective, but are laced by a kind of scientificism 
that concedes to an inherent imperfection. This is in agreement with 
Cartwright’s description of science not as some unifying amalgam 
of top-down theories (a “pyramid”) but, instead, a pluralist “patch-
work.” We can liken the conception of science’s “written truths” to 
what Laruelle’s Maoist student, Gilles Grelet, calls the “transactional 
arrangement,” or a “bribe,” “whereby where what is called truth is 
in reality the ideal - all of this being just another name for lying.”57
Similarly, Kolozova states that Laruelle’s Real is “obstinately in-
different to the pretensions of language or thought, whereas lan-
guage continues to unilaterally correlate with the real seeking to 
mediate it.”58 Thus, this is the difference between Laruelle’s cor-
relation and Meillassoux’s. Whereas Meillassoux’s conception of 
correlation is based on an extension of subjectivity (whether it be 
freedom, will, or creativity), with an arche-fossil “ancestral time,” 
or “hyperchaos” pre-dating ontologies of the human, Laruelle’s 
conception of correlation is in direct opposition to Meillassoux’s. 
For Meillassoux “hyperchaos” is time without becoming, or “the 
absolute absence of reason for any reality… the effective ability for 
every determined entity, whether it is an event, a thing, or a law, 
to appear and disappear with no reason for its being or non-be-
ing.”59 As neatly described by what he calls “non-analysis” (or “du-
alysis”), Laruelle’s correlation does not describe how thought seeks 
to correlate with the Real but, instead, how thought (and/or lan-
guage) correlate and mediate the Real; as Laruelle’s conception 
of correlation, “dualysis” is the unfettering of empirical naïvite.60 
Laruelle (and post-Laruellians including Grelet, Fardy, Ó Maoilearca 
and Kolozova) advocate for a categorical withdrawal from the 
“impotence of thought” and its “infinite culpability.”61 “Infinite 
56 Laruelle, A Biography, 125.
57 Grelet, “Proletarian Gnosis,” 95.
58 Kolozova, Holocaust of Animals, 6.
59 Quentin Meillassoux, Time Without Becoming, ed. by Anna Longo (Milan: Mimesis Internation-
al, 2014), 258.
60 Laruelle, Philosophy and Non-Philosophy, 156.
61 François Laruelle, “Theorems on the Good News,” Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Human-
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culpability” describes the complicit precarity of theoretical plen-
titude with counterfactual reflection and is the byproduct of what 
Laruelle discerns as philosophy’s “impotence of thought,”62 as phi-
losophy necessarily liquidates the plane of pure immanence by 
enacting the Decision, thereby introducing terms of difference. 
In Stiegler’s literature, we see an equally definitive and seductive 
ontological problematization of Kant. Describing the contempo-
rary social context, Stiegler demonstrates how we occupy a purely 
computational social epoch of desolate time and incommensurable 
tragedy. In the age of “digital natives,” Stiegler argues that we are 
simply incapable of producing intergenerational and transgener-
ational collective anticipations, or “transindividuation,” except in 
a purely negative context. For Stiegler, such a “negative teleology 
thereby reaches its end without purpose (and not that purposive-
ness without end that provides the motives of Kantian reason).”63 
 Steeped in Heidegger, Husserl, Simondon, Derrida and Leroi-Gour-
han, Stiegler’s philosophical project has been devoted to uncovering 
technologically constituted temporalities that endure as ontological 
structures. While these temporalities are not perceptible and have 
heterogenous origins, they introduce a transcendent element that 
directly informs the socialization of truth, with truth’s temporality 
occupying something akin to the scientific “simulation” and nonhi-
erarchization we see in Schmid’s modeling: science is pluralistic, 
conditional, and privy to nonepistemological (recursive) redescrip-
tion. As Mercedes Bunz adeptly notes, Stiegler’s ontological view 
can be seen as a prolonged critique of the Kantian definition of time 
as an inner form of intuition and, thus, as a category specific to the 
humanities64 or, in Laruellian parlance, the “philosophical decision.” 
Following Laruelle, the “Philosophical Decision” is that which subor-
dinates identity, or “the being of the 1,” to intellect, or “the thinking 
of the 1 as equal to 1,” such that “the being” and the “thinking of 
that being” are equipollent.65 If, according to Laruelle, the Real is be-
yond the brink of exteriority and, thus, it can solely be (replicated/
cloned as) the object of “fictionalization,” for Stiegler, it is the tech-
ities, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2014), 42.
62 Ibid.
63 Stiegler, The Age of Disruption, 12.
64 Mercedes Bunz, Birgit Mara Kaiser and Kathrin Thiele (Eds.), Symptoms of the Planetary Condi-
tion: A Critical Vocabulary (Lüneberg: meson press, 2017), 203.
65 Anthony Paul Smith, François Laruelle’s Principles of Non-Philosophy: A Critical Introduction 
and Guide (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 74.
nological artefact/technē that occupies the role of the philosophical 
decision. Through the reformulation of spectral value-exchange vis-
à-vis what Kolozova terms “anthropocentric mythologemes,”66 we 
see the emergence of Stiegler’s relationship as it relates to Laruelle’s 
non-standard philosophy in how Stiegler regards technics as nec-
essarily formalizing the exteriorization of difference and identity.
In their own ways, Laruelle and Stiegler both problematize the per-
formative philosophical decision, which enacts its own ontic lim-
it conditions on that which is pre-symbolic and pre-linguistic. For 
Laruelle, it is the speech act that remains decisionist.67 For Stiegler, 
who is an unapologetic pupil of Derrida, it is the grammatization 
between exteriorization and the reproduction of “living flows,” or 
history’s making itself discrete (or materially manifest through 
artefacts), which determines culture - whether these are bodily 
movements, gestures, speech, images, calculations or dreams.68 
For Stiegler, grammatization is an ortho-graphic condition where 
the inaugurality of history is deferred, a synthesis which can be 
understood as temporality materially incarnate. Stiegler’s artefac-
tually-bound and trans-historical unfolding of grammatization pro-
ceeds from something akin to Laruellian superpositioning, as what 
pre-exists becomes non-trivially determined through language - 
technesis is not solely “the faculty of dreaming” but, as Wilson fur-
ther demonstrates, the very function of perception.69 For Stiegler, 
this pre-linguistic and pre-symbolic indeterminate flux is noesis, 
which is pure and unformulated capacity, or an “unforeseen situa-
tion”70 that is inchoate prior to observation. Following Stiegler, the 
moment that “analysis” or “critique” is culled into action is the mo-
ment of mental schematization, whereby consciousness projects its 
object - this is what Daniel Ross and Stiegler term ”arche-cinema.”71 
Not only is the dream the primordial form, the hydrous vat of mor-
phological becoming, but it is also where we see Stiegler’s instan-
tiation of what Laruelle terms the “Philosophical Decision,” as we 
see the introduction of “a bifurcation into a state of fact - a state of 
66 Kolozova, Holocaust of Animals, 25.
67 John Ò Maoilearca, All Thoughts Are Equal: Laruelle and Nonhuman Philosophy (Minneapolis, 
Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2015), 245.
68 Stiegler, The Age of Disruption, 240.
69 Wilson, Aesthesis and Perceptronium.
70 Stiegler, The Age of Disruption, 284.
71 Bernard Stiegler, “Organology of Dreams and Archi-Cinema,” trans. by Daniel Ross, The Nordic 
Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. No. 47 (2014), 7-37.
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law being what produces a bifurcation starting from a state of fact, 
which thereby becomes lawfully and performatively regulated.”72 
Nonetheless, unlike Laruelle, Stiegler indicates some kind of ontic 
framework that is stilted on difference for, without cerebral ma-
teriality, there would be no such conditions for the performative 
philosophical decision of exosomatization. For Stiegler, superposi-
tioning does not antedate noesis and, therefore, we can consider 
the brain as the artefactual nexus of epistemological discontinuity, 
from which all insurrectional flows disperse through the (mental) 
construction of arche-traces. For Stiegler, the pluralist realm of 
truths and scientific facticity is, indeed, a patchwork - perhaps even 
one that stretches into infinitude - but it is a Klein bottle that passes 
through the organon of perception, thus determined by the unfold-
ing of encephalization and the conditions of observation. Contend-
ing with Laruelle’s conception of the non-artefactual Real, Stiegler’s 
system would have to make a necessary compromise and relinquish 
the brain as the ontogenetic site of the (mediated) Real, technically 
manifest. While Stiegler may, as Ian James states, be aptly catego-
rized as a philosopher of material immanence, he does not commit 
to an antirealist critique of scientific objectivity the likes of Laruelle, 
as, for Stiegler, technicity is inseparable from this “discretizing” pro-
cess. Laruellian non-philosophy is predicated on thinking the Real 
through a unilateral relation, due to the Real’s indifference. While, for 
Laruelle, thought correlates with the Real, in Stiegler’s onto-graph-
ic philosophy we see a remnant of world-spirit’s recurrent synthe-
sis, the ushering of thought along the historical pull of technesis.
Stiegler and the Posthuman
…it is through this such loop - one that passes 
through exosomatization and which, as organogen-
esis, transforms, through the artificial organs that it 
generates, somatic and psychic organs and social or-
ganizations - and only through this loop, that noesis 
properly speaking, that is, thinking, is constituted.73 
Not only, as aforementioned, is Stiegler’s theory of individuation 
highly indebted to Gilbert Simondon’s psychosocial understand-
72 Ibid.
73 Stiegler, The Age of Disruption, 61.
ing of pre-subjective affects but, also, to Andre Leroi-Gourhan’s 
description of human history’s dawn as the point of artificializa-
tion between humankind and technical artefacts, termed “homi-
nization.” Rather than the artefactual outthrust of Ernst Kapp’s 
“organ projection” or Marshall McLuhan’s theory of machines as 
the continuation of our central nervous system, Stiegler devel-
ops Alfred Lotka and Nicolas Georgescu-Roegen’s bio-statistical 
description of exosomatization. This inflected process is bidirec-
tional: the continuation of organogenesis is a characteristic of the 
evolution of life, both as ontogenesis and as phylogenesis. Exo-
somatization is an infrastructural configuration that is not only 
externalized outwards, through technics, but, in an inflected turn, 
commodifies the human capacity for reason and thought. If we 
describe this process through the aperture of externalization, 
then we must match it with a commensurate degree of inversion.
In his work with Antoinette Rouvroy, we see Stiegler’s most tech-
nically rigorous Marxian description of algorithmic governmental-
ity, as the duo describe a turn away from “deductive logic,” which 
we can associate with the database, towards “a purely inductive 
logic.”74 While the two do not speak of any particular machines, 
this turn can be characterized by a rich array of case studies that 
cull probabilistic algorithmic technologies that are based on Heb-
bian learning. According to this model, recursive negative feedback 
functions as a new modal input for the instrumental relations be-
tween protocol and intermittent change-action.75 Recall Hebb’s ad-
age that “neurons that fire together, wire together” - when neurons 
are activated together by the same stimulus, their connections are 
strengthened, eliciting new tangential vectors of integration and 
mechanism independency. One marked example of this inductive 
logic is AlphaGo, the Google DeepMind neural network that defeat-
ed both the world’s highest-ranking Go player, Ke Jie, and 18-time 
world Go champion Lee Sedol. This was achieved by AlphaGo’s us-
ing “tree search” pattern recognition and machine learning to prob-
abilistically account for simulative scenarios. By iteratively building 
partial search-inputs with which to update its “weights” - or the de-
74 Antoinette Rouvroy and Bernard Stiegler, “The Digital Regime of Truth: From the Algorithmic 
Governmentality to a New Rule of Law,” trans. by Anaïs Nony and Benoît Dillet, La Delueziana, 
Vol. 3 (2016), 7.
75 Joscha Bach, Principles of Synthetic Intelligence: Psi: An Architecture of Motivated Cognition 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 232.
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fault values of selection - such neural nets are able to start at a root 
node and recursively create non-terminal values that are revised ac-
cording to “backpropagation,” or how simulated error scenarios un-
fold as reactive gradient of layering. These multilayer “feedforward” 
neural networks are based on the binary classification of perceptual 
negative feedback, which can be recounted to Frank Rosenblatt’s 
1957 “Perceptron,” a rule-based conception of an algorithm that en-
ables neurons to associatively learn and process discrete elements. 
The slippage between “perceptron” and “perception” is no coinci-
dence: error-correction is accounted for in the same way that visual 
perception eliminates noise. Perception-based inductive learning 
marks a significant rift from the era of the database, where evalu-
ation metrics could not deviate from a certain sample-proportion.76
While such cognitive architecture - based on active inference and 
reinforcement through homeostatic balance - marks our era’s tech-
nological expropriation of sensorimotor perception and counterfac-
tually rich simulative scenarios, Stiegler and Rouvroy also speak of a 
“post-statistical” and “post-actuarial” epoch “in which it is no longer 
about calculating probabilities but to account in advance for what 
escapes probability and thus the excess of the possible on the prob-
able.”77 Unlike David Roden’s description of transhumanism, Stiegler 
and Rouvroy foresee a posthuman outpouching of interpretation 
and prediction, whereby neurocomputational architecture is able to 
actively retrofit causality alongside mean-values of incoming data 
that are precluded to human-statistical aggregation. Transhuman-
ism emphasizes technological extension and libidinal maximization, 
as demonstrated by transhumanist NBIC fantasies of mind-upload-
ing, life-prolonging and prosthetic extension. However, posthuman 
“machines” - which are, truly, neither machines nor cyborgs - are 
able to access the manifold quantum fold of superpositioning and 
confirm predictive enaction by collapsing this into top-down ap-
perceptual content. The “post” in this conception of the “post-hu-
man” - or Stiegler’s “post-statistical”/”post-actuarial” - rests upon 
this conceptual capability to operate in accord to phenomenolog-
ical information that is occluded from our “human” ability to re-
flect on and make predictions according to embodied experience.
76 Bach, Principles, 224-240.
77 Rouvroy and Stiegler, “The Digital Regime,” 9.
Stiegler’s use of “entropy” is not solely related to political idealism 
but also environmental denegation, as he recalls the entropic dis-
sipation of resources in the era of the Anthropocene, or “Entropo-
cene.” As Wilson recalls, the crux of the “Entropocene” argument 
is that, as we see a quantum entanglement of integrated synthe-
sis regarding neural nets and machine learning, an increase of in-
tegration/synthesis, or “mutual information” between an observed 
system (the given object of observation) and the environment 
system will follow. In turn, the entropy (or hidden information) of 
our world-system will exponentially decrease; this scenario im-
plies the stratification of the emergent levels of material reality. 
Stiegler advocates for a re-appropriation of these technical sys-
tems so as to broaden flexibility and freedom in relation to these 
stratified causal constraints. This “negentropic,” or more accurately 
“anti-entropic” (as Giuseppe Longo and Maël Montévil remind us) 
possibility locally resists and delays the incessant movement of 
the cosmos toward disintegration and entropy. This transpires in 
the portending of noetic dreaming, or the expansion of the pre-lin-
guistic capacity for transindividuation but, also, in ecological ac-
tion through environmental legislation. Anti-entropic activity, or 
the deferral of entropic activity, is Stiegler’s definition for “life.”78 
 “Anti-entropy” demonstrates one such further distinction between 
Stiegler’s conception of the Real and Laruelle’s. For Stiegler, the in-
choate Real of pure potentiality occupies some kind of spatio-tempo-
ral limit-case, allowing it to veer towards expansion and multiplicity 
in the case of a negentropic future or, in the case of further environ-
mental-technological entropy, the Real of “available energy” as it is 
further deprived. In Laruelle’s non-philosophy, due to the pure terms 
of superposition, the Real is absolutely non-conceivable in schemat-
ic or spatial terms - it has no directional flow or boundaries through 
which the real and the cosmos simplify the realizations of thought 
itself through the facticity of technics or energetic dissolution. 
What, then, distinguishes Stiegler’s understanding of the constant 
and irrespective constitution of omnitemporal conditions - in which 
the technical form of life is always materially directed vis-à-vis 
prosthesis - from teleologically-orchestrated transhumanism? As 
78 Bernard Stiegler, “Dreams and Nightmares: Beyond the Anthropocene Era,” trans. by Daniel 
Ross, ALIENOCENE: Journal of the First Outernational, No. 5 (2019), 9.
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Yuk Hui notes, Stiegler’s conception of technology is also a form 
of heredity, as it is subject to mutation and is passed to us as a cul-
ture.79 For Stiegler, contingency remains close to the spatialization 
of time and artistic creation by rendering the unexpected with-
in epochal constraints. Technology, as such, consists of a means 
of living but is not handed to as eternal being - rather, technology 
enjoinders, immediately, with the environment in a theory of evo-
lution understood as a dialectical movement between adaptation 
and adoption. Technesis as transindividuation marks a synthesis 
of machines’ becoming-organic rather than what transhuman-
ist discourses emphasize, which are organs’ becoming-synthetic. 
However, the contemporaneous locution of post-humanist dis-
course, which so often veers its transhumanist head, is intent on 
affirming what Roden terms as the “disconnection thesis.” This 
“unbounded posthumanism” instantiates a disunion between 
diachronically emergent behaviors and properties, which occur 
as a result of temporally extended processes but cannot be in-
ferred from the initial state of that process. The rift, therefore, is 
not a further demonstration of the bidirectional cognitive-tech-
nological relationship qua Stiegler. Rather, the posthuman mo-
ment is defined by machines’ co-opting an apophatic “post-sta-
tistical” realizability by continually retrofitting unequivocal 
foresight. As Roden states, the “disconnection thesis” does not 
entail the rejection of anthropological essentialism but, instead, 
“renders any reference to essential human characteristics unnec-
essary.”80 If our technological epoch of predictive processing algo-
rithms and neural nets is based on perception, then the post-hu-
man moment will render any reference to perception obsolete.
At this point, before we move on to a Laruellian-inspired ter-
rain of the non-human as a political alternative to the posthuman 
project’s technogenetic tyranny, let us underscore a distinction 
between posthumanism and transhumanism that is so often elid-
ed. The transhumanist itinerary is that of the perfection of human 
nature and the cultivation of human personal autonomy through 
technological means. Therefore, transhumanism “makes an eth-
79 Hui, Recursivity and Contingency, 207-11.
80 David Roden, Posthuman Life: Philosophy at the Edge of the Human (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2014), 114.
ical claim to the effect that the technological enhancement of 
human capacities is a desirable aim.”81 What Roden terms “specu-
lative posthumanism” (SP), or just “posthumanism,” does not 
make such normative claims or ethical commitments but, instead, 
criticizes all anthropocentric means of life, making a bold onto-
logical claim about what technology can metaphysically allow. Es-
chewing machine-human couplings, the posthuman is based on 
pure difference. In short, posthumans are technologically engen-
dered beings that no longer occupy familiar human morphologies.
From discussions on post-capitalist automatization to discourse on 
Artificial Generalized Intelligence (AGI), this transhumanist “dis-
connection” privileges the automaton’s making animality obsolete, 
usurping all recognizable retentional/protentional phenomenolog-
ical distributions. As demonstrated by predictive processing algo-
rithms and Bayesian neuro-inferential continuous computation, 
today’s technologies are increasingly modelled after the psychic 
faculty and behavior learning’s localist architecture. As in the case 
of elastic graph-bunching facial recognition technologies, High Fre-
quency Trading (HFT) with AI, and neural networks like AlphaGo, 
associative memory structures and symbolic cognitive modeling 
are displacing the storage-and-retrieval model of the database. 
If AlphaGo and Bayesian neuro-inference can be considered 
“post-actuarial” or “post-statistical,” as Stiegler insists, it is not be-
cause they escape the numeric directive of statistics but, instead, 
because they widen the aperture for statistics and introduce dyna-
micity into data-pooling. To call this “post-statistical” is provocative 
but, truly, this is unambiguously the domain of transhumanism. 
Terming this as “post-statistical” aptly breaks from our understand-
ing of cognitive neuro-inferential technologies, whereby memory 
retrieval and elasticity is constitutive but, in turn, also overdeter-
mines the functionalist channeling between a system and its en-
vironment, as if some extra-probabilistic synthesis could transpire 
between an AGI and its appropriated world-image. Within Stiegler’s 
harrowing conception of a “post-actuarial” or “post-statistical” 
reality, the entropic declension of the human geistig is matched 
by a kind of transhuman Intelligence. Accordingly, Stiegler’s ne-
gentropy assumes transhuman machines’ penetrating the bar-
ricade of the Real, hereby departing significantly from Laruelle.
81 Ibid., 9.
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Lariviere and Galloway assert that Stiegler’s pedagogical and phe-
nomenological belief in the value of “revealing nature” allows us to 
escape from the transdividual circuitry of control by revealing the 
limits of the thinkable. By “nature” they recall the “uncompressed 
natural real” while setting aside Stiegler’s historical distinctions, as 
revealed by his work with Rouvroy. The two discern that, for Stiegler, 
the real is “unknowable” and “technology is nature’s compressor.”82 
Yet, if, for Stiegler, technesis is so widely diffracted that from mental 
imagination to artefactual reality, all is technological, do not Lariviere 
and Galloway inadvertently bridge Laruelle’s Real with Stiegler’s?
For Stiegler, noesis is a technesis. Stiegler seeks to take into account 
what Heidegger overlooked in Being and Time: that Dasein always 
projects itself beyond its ends, and inhabits its own mortality only 
within the primordial projection of a continuation of the world af-
ter its own end (“in its beyond”).83 Protention is, therefore, always 
bound to a structure which is that of a promise, and as such to a mu-
tual engagement that infinitively exceeds the psychic individual.84 
It is through this “loop” that Stiegler vies for a “noesis proper,” or 
noesis that passes into actuality as entelekheia,85 or fulfilment. For 
Stiegler, the transcendental is rooted in “the dream realizing itself” 
vis-à-vis phenomenological time, or time lived within the specific 
mode of what Aristotle called the “noetic soul,” as it is constituted 
and conditioned by technical exteriorization, resulting in a process 
of interiorization that exosomatizes existence.86 Exosomatization, 
as was originally shown by Lotka87 and Georgescu-Rœgen,88 is the 
organogenesis of artefacts that constitute the underpinnings of 
knowledge. For Stiegler, organogenesis is the elaborating of tech-
nical instruments of emancipatory experiments and relational 
experiences among technical, physiological, and institutional or-
gans. That which is organogenetic is pharmacological - as human 
evolution is the result of an exosomatic (symbolic, recorded) or-
ganogenesis it is, in fact, what drives evolution (or organogenesis). 
82 Lariviere and Galloway, “Compression,” 132.
83 Ibid., 20.
84 Ibid., 21.
85 Stiegler, The Age of Disruption, 84.
86 Ibid., 61.
87 Alfred J. Lotka, Elements of Mathematical Biology (Mineola, New York: Dover Publications), 
188.
88 Nicholas Georgescu-Rœgen, The Entropy Law and the Economic Process (Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971).
Throughout his work, Stiegler (drawing from Husserl) speaks of re-
tentions, whereby primary retentions are sense perceptions, sec-
ondary retentions are memories, and tertiary retentions are media 
(culture mnemonics). While Stiegler is indebted to Simondon, it is 
through Husserl’s phenomenology of time-consciousness and Der-
ridean grammatology that he transposes the logic of the supplement 
to transfigure “tertiary retentions” or those conditions of possibility 
that facilitate the interplay between primary retention and second-
ary retention. Thus, “digital tertiary retentions” are generated by 
the “conquest of space and time through its technicization,”89 which 
we are increasingly inching towards via governmental calculability. 
For Stiegler, “tertiary retentions,” or media mnemonics (whether 
they be mechanic, analogue, or digital), introduce both emanci-
patory possibilities and newfound repressions. For instance, in ad-
dition to surveillance and meta-data capture, the internet allows 
for the possibility of open-source “free software,” stimulating new 
subject positions.90 This dualism has guided much of Stiegler’s 
work and his more recent application of Giuseppe Longo and 
Schrodinger’s concept of “negentropy” to the Anthropocene, so 
as to inspire a media-ecological relationship birthed from the com-
mons that can evade our bleak trajectory (“neganthropy”). If en-
tropy indexes the material disappearance of ecological resources, 
“neganthropy” is always defined in relation to an observer, or “no-
etic freedom,” allotting epistemic and epistemological transitions. 
Stiegler’s Marxist conclusion is fairly utilitarian, as he ushers legisla-
tive and social “communing,” as demonstrated by the various proj-
ects undertaken by the Institut de recherche et d’innovation (IRI) 
collective, with initiatives spearheaded by Stiegler, Giacomo Gilm-
ozzi, Patrick Braouezec and a host of economists, philosophers, 
educators and political scientists. In addition to the Plain Com-
mune experimental learning territory in Saint-Denis, based on open 
source technologies and an economy of contributive income based 
on the “collective capabilities” of self-governance, Stiegler has re-
cently launched a macro-ecological United Nations initiative called 
Internation.World. The Internation.World collective will be present-
89 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota 
Press), x.
90 Thomas Pringle, Gertrud Koch and Bernard Stiegler, Machine (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Uni-
versity of Minnesota Press, 2019), 40.
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ing a proposal at the United Nations 2020 World Summit that at-
tempts to extend the contributory learning project to a global scale. 
Having examined how Stiegler seeks to evade the “entropic” trans-
humanist absorption of technicity, let us turn, once more, to Laru-
elle’s non-philosophy. In particular, by examining contemporary 
Laruellians such as Kolozova and Ó Maoilearca, who have focused 
on discourses regarding the non-human and animality, we shall 
demonstrate how non-philosophy can radicalize the dyad of animal-
ity/automaton. This allows for a bridge from Stiegler’s politically-di-
rected communal projects to Laruelle’s avowedly utopian thinking.
Post-Laruellians and the Non-Human
Antecedent to what Laurelle terms the philosophical decision, there 
exists a “radical dyad” of Thought and the Real that conveys an “un-
bridgeable fissure” between the two terms.91 In Capitalism’s Holo-
caust of Animals, contemporary Laruellian and feminist philosopher 
Katerina Kolozova considers how Laruelle’s radical dyad’s “identity 
in the last instance” is determined by the concreteness of its con-
stitution, or the material constitution of the “animal-machine” (or 
of “physicality-automaton”).92 Kolozova’s non-philosophical treat-
ment of the human invites the use of the terms “non-human” and 
“inhuman,” rather than the transhuman usurpation of technesis. As 
demonstrated by Kolozova’s use of Laruelle’s radical dyad, the “iden-
tity in the last instance” of the non-human is homologous to Donna 
Haraway’s conception of cyborg and the inhuman. The non-human’s 
“determination in the last instance” belongs to the category of the 
Real insofar as the Real is instantiated as a specific form of materiality. 
By liquidating philosophy of its anthropomorphic latticework qua 
Laruelle’s methodological system, Kolozova attempts to recon-
cile the dyad that transhumanist literature has almost uniform-
ly prefigured. As exemplified by Haraway’s bifurcation between 
animality and the automaton, post-humanist literature insists 
upon a riven relation between technology on one node and an-
imality on the other node of this dyad. It is this dyad that formu-
lates the fundamental crux of Kolozova’s most recent project, as 
91 Katerina Kolozova, “Violence: The Indispensable Condition of the Law (And the Political),” 
Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2014), 109.
92 Kolozova, Holocaust of Animals, 11.
she transcends Haraway’s posthumanism, which urges that the 
subjugated bodies and “decentered selves” of post-humanist pro-
duction ought to seize the ordinary means of capitalist militarism, 
as both the animal and the human have become inextricably hy-
bridized via technological life. However, Kolozova’s conception of 
the non-human as a kind of “radical decentering” is far more rad-
ical than Haraway’s hybridization. Kolozova prompts a non-Eu-
clidean, non-thetic transformation that grows from Laruelle’s 
“non-Marxist” work, which critiques the decisional transcenden-
tal, a presupposition for hybridity, as both ancillary and subser-
vient to the atavist underpinnings of subject-centered language. 
By advocating for a material theory of under-determining the hu-
man, Kolozova’s unique conception of the “non-human” prompts a 
conception of intellectual and cognitive faculties as being involved 
in a complicit ascendency to the Real. If Laruelle’s work on Marx of-
fers us an altogether radical material praxis, is it not simply because 
it offers us a retreat from the traditional Marxist terms of mutual 
exchange and relational reciprocity, as Alexander Galloway con-
tends.93 In addition to a complete evacuation from humanism as 
anthropocentric carnality, based on gestures of exchange and con-
vertibility between the Real and thought, Laruelle’s “non-Marxist” 
system conceives of humanity as an “identity-in-the-last-instance” 
that, coupled with our aforementioned description of “determi-
nation-in-the-last instance,” demonstrates a kind of fundamen-
tally materialist vulnerability, whereby the (non-)human becomes 
a category of contingency rather than some kind of Absolute. 
Unlike the transhumanist fetishization of the Übermensch-cum-
AGI, the cyborg presents Kolozova with a passage towards the 
non-human. Indeed, the non-human indexes a feminist figure 
that disrupts standard homologies of ontological exchange (e.g., 
marriage), but what is critical here is that there subsists a spectral 
“remainder” that escapes sense-conditioning and the teleological 
transhumanist purpose of “humanity transcending itself.”94 Har-
away’s dyad between animal and machine is reproduced in Kolo-
zova’s system of the non-human, poised against the “automaton” 
93 Alexander Galloway, Laruelle: Against the Digital (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2014), 27.
94 Kolozova, Holocaust of Animals, 12.
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of signification. Whereas Stiegler’s conception of noesis attempts 
to arrive at the Real through thought (or, as Laruelle would term 
it, “philosophizing,” proper), Kolozova furthers Laruelle’s insis-
tence upon thought as a mere “fictionalized” cloning of the Real. 
Recall that, for Stiegler, capitalist “proletarianization” describes a 
new precariat/cognitariat - an order of “knowledge workers” who are 
mnemotechnically captured and industrially automated through no-
etic hymenoptera, or the exploitation of social corporeality through 
cognitive labor. For Stiegler, cognitive ergonomics comfortably se-
duce and produce the “perfect citizen consumer” who not only shops 
online but, simultaneously, produces meaningful metadata that 
is condensed into information and sold as a commodity. The first 
dimension, the proletarianization of the producer, directly draws 
from Marx; the worker’s knowledge is inscribed in the machine, 
whereby specialization is reduced to a mere abstraction of activity. 
As the historical trajectory from the first moment of proletarianiza-
tion to hyper-industrial postmodernity and “cognitive capitalism” 
evinces, for Stiegler it is the displacement of intellectual activity 
that binds noetic activity to Capital flow. These historical processes 
reveal how Stiegler’s real functions, a recursive Spinozist causality 
establishing contingency between a living being and their milieu.
Kolozova demonstrates how the purpose of Laruelle’s “clon-
ing” is not merely to demonstrate how the Real functions but, 
instead, to demonstrate how proletarianization is manifest-
ed through the seizure of abstract labor for wage labor. This is a 
point of collective closure between Stiegler and Laruelle’s con-
ception of proletarianization. However, as opposed to the au-
to-referential postulation of exchange-value, which determines 
the Marxist medium of relation, Laruelle’s non-Marxist formu-
lation is grounded by the principle of physicality being indepen-
dent from representations. As demonstrated by the schemati-
zation of noesis vis-à-vis entropic and negentropic becoming, 
Stiegler’s is bound to a representational sublation of the Real.
Kolozova also further demonstrates how Laruelle uncovers that phi-
losophy produces an amphibology, whereby sign, thought and truth 
are ceded as “indistinguishable from the real.”95 The destruction of 
brute materiality - the blighting of animality - is the central fixture of 
Kolozova’s metaphor of the rites of holocaustos, or, etymologically, 
the “burning of the dead animal.”96 Where the enagismata, or ritual 
Greek offerings to the dead, were supplementary (e.g., the bene-
faction of milk, honey, wine or perfumes), the holocaustos serves 
as the foundation of logos, law and order in the polis through “[t] 
-he destruction of the physical body,” thus ensuring the “immor-
tal light of reason.”97 The cycle of Capital invigorates the complete 
holocaust of all animality and material vestiges so as to insure that 
the absolute rule of “pure reason,” or of “Absolute Spirit,” finds its 
immaterial thrust in its perfected form: capitalism-as-philosophy.
Kolozova identifies “pure value” with the sacrificial burnt body in the 
holocaustos, which represents the subordination of life to philosophy 
in the name of Reason and light.98 As Kolozova recounts, within this 
sacrificial Olympian ritual there subsists the preservation of life and 
reason, hiereia, which remains attached to the physical body as a tran-
scendental product. Thus, the sacrificed burnt body is transformed 
into the transcendental. This “becoming” of “pure value” is the pro-
cess of abstraction, whereby a signifying chain encloses around the 
processual accumulation of exchange and worth-accumulation. 
Radicalizing the dyad, Kolozova’s work on Laruelle’s “Vision-in-
One” - manifest as an indifferent determination that is not bound 
to human-psychological identification, but universal compossi-
bility - radicalizes philosophies of animality based on différance. 
Kolozova recognizes that the reduction of the animal as a general 
equivalent of the Real - as in Haraway and Derrida’s literature - is 
the exact same reduction that is the foundational gesture of cap-
italist reciprocity, which “grounds and sustains patriarchy and 
heteronormative sexuality” as a “general equivalent... reified ab-
straction.”99 In Stiegler’s system, noesis is continually technically 
synthesized as an automata devoid of epiphenomenal sensoria, 
appropriated for framing truth claims by instantiating the real. 
95 Ibid., 38.
96 Ibid., vi, vii, 111.
97 Ibid., 111.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid., 147.
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Ó Maoilearca writes about how, rather than “reduce, replace, or 
eliminate”100 philosophical distinctions, Laruellian immanence 
subjugates and inverts Being to genericity, thus initiating a fully 
democratic revision whereby no one view is superior to, or tran-
scends, the other. Unlike posthumanist theses that claim that hu-
manity must move beyond contingency, Ó Maoilearca describes 
how “any Laruellian nonhumanism will always be much messier 
than this, resting a good deal more on a non-philosophical imper-
fectability than on man’s approximation to the divine, the infinite, 
and the perfect.”101 However, radicalizing Stiegler’s constitution 
of noesis as technesis, we can say that we are always becoming 
trans-human, as mental apperception is a spatio-temporal relation 
that demonstrates how the human being is “the fact of technic-
ity.”102 If, for Stiegler, the process of socialization “clones” noesis 
through trans-generational technical circuits that instantiate the 
real, for Laruelle this is little more than another example of the 
Real as it anthropomorphizes Man, “philosomorphizing” both the 
Real and humanity after its own (dormant and noetic) image.103
Stiegler uses the category of the ”non-inhuman” to describe the 
being that realizes itself through the precision of mechanics and, 
“realizing its dreams,” as in materially producing them through 
artefacts, exosomatizes itself. Stiegler’s theory of arche-cinema is 
based on Marc Azéma’s work on Man as the animal who not only 
has “always ‘dreamed’” but, in turn, whose “brain is a machine for 
producing images” that is “capable of projecting his inner ‘cine-
ma’ outside himself.”104 By realizing its dreams, the non-inhuman 
escapes its status as automata and becomes noetic. According to 
Stiegler, animality’s organogenesis “completely escapes them,”105 
and, consequently, Stiegler repeats the same move that Kolozova 
critiques in Haraway and Derrida as, for all three philosophers, an-
imality simply becomes a stand-in for the instrumental capacity of 
Capital. In fact, Stiegler collapses animality with anoetic dreaming, 
whereby animality is pre-linguistic and pre-symbolic, unable to in-
100 Ó Maoilearca, All Thoughts, 11.
101 Ibid., 189. 
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid., 183.
104 Stiegler, The Age of Disruption, 90.
105 Ibid., 184.
stantiate a typology of difference and precluded from conceiving 
of the world schematically.106 In turn, Stiegler “generalizes” ani-
mality, just as today’s capitalism generalizes proletarianization.
Conclusion
Jason Lariviere and Alexander Galloway remark that 
[f]rom a position alongside philosophy, Laruelle’s 
non-philosophy adopts a different kind of signal pro-
cessing. Opacity becomes a general condition of the 
cosmos itself. … Unlike Stiegler, who strives to reveal 
an enchanted, natural world through the develop-
ment of the noetic organs, Laruelle remains encrypt-
ed within the radical immanence of generic being. All 
superfluous philosophical data has been deleted.107 
However, this description of “generic being” enacts a capital-
ist fetishization of the Real and the One, which does not ad-
here to Laruelle’s non-philosophical system, whereby there is no 
such generic being, as non-philosophy is predicated on liquidat-
ing Being, which is the amphibology of the Real and thought par 
excellence. The “generic science” of non-philosophy is gener-
ic and immanent insofar as it takes genericity as a starting point 
from which to rethink the aims and possibilities of philosophy. 
“Generic science” is the proper name for the non-philosophi-
cal cloning of standard philosophy and, consequently, this is by 
no means a “deletion” but a duplication; there is not a “loss” of 
data but, instead, a reconceptualization of (philosophical) data.
Furthermore, Lariviere and Galloway remark that “Stiegler uses the 
term grammatization… to indicate how human experience is com-
pressed into discrete units of mediation” and that Stiegler’s argu-
ment about the materialization of diachronic memory as exterior-
ized technics, or “tertiary retentions,” speaks to the “compressive 
106 Stiegler’s conception of animality as pre-exosomatic reduces the animal as an immaterial 
source exploitable for commodity-production. Were Stiegler to apply his own logic of exoso-
matization to animal case studies, however, he would see the fatuity of this distinction. This 
is demonstrated by the many animals that produce exo-somatic tools: just as orangutans use 
whistles to communicate and ward off predators, sea otters have been known to use stones to 
hammer abalone shells off of rocks so as to crack shells open; this is to say nothing of animals 
that have a mental conception of autonoetic conception, or an arche-cinema. 
107 Lariviere and Galloway, “Compression,” 140. 
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power of grammatization to turn the theoretically infinite layers 
of experience into discrete, manageable, and archivable units.”108 
However, the very fact that there exists a pre-symbolic site that 
becomes mnemotechnical through the matrixial arche-cinema 
of the unconscious, in which the dream is the primordial form, 
demonstrates that human experience is not so “manageable.” 
Processes of transdividuation elude us until they have already ex-
acted their full force, temporally constituting themselves beyond 
Being. Elsewhere, Stiegler has remarked that “philosophy has re-
pressed technics as an object of thought” and that “[t]echnics is 
the unthought.”109 While technicity is appropriable, to cast tech-
nics under the spell of compression or decompression denies that 
machines are purely instrumental. In fact, even if today’s machines 
cast an artificial cast so wide as to transfigure Arachnean linealities 
beyond our conceptual purview, Stiegler’s technological inscrip-
tion provides us with a way to trace the originary co-constitution 
of the human in parallel with the technical, providing us with a de-
scription whereby we can understand human thought’s bind with 
consciousness under an emergent and entirely material dimension 
of synthesis. Synthesis, as an inflected process that affects both 
mind and body (or a “general organology”), offers the generative 
element prohibited by compression or decompression’s ahistoricity.
Furthermore, I have tried to demonstrate some linkages between 
Stiegler and Laruelle, although there are certainly others. Both 
philosophers, for instance, upbraid politics’ insistence on “an-
thropo-logical difference.”110 For Laruelle, this is a fetish of “[u] 
-nity par excellence - the State and the other fetishes of political 
thought,”111 which is reflected by the fetish of a unitary philoso-
phy that always appeals to some metaphysical and contaminative 
Other. Stiegler’s rejection of “anthropo-logical difference” is in 
regards to the techno-fetishistic eschatology spurred by automa-
tion, as it draws from the superficial transhumanist impulse that 
seeks enhancement or augmentation,112 with the cultural industry 
able to short-circuit transindividuation vis-à-vis the manipulation 
108 Ibid., 140, 128.
109 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. by Richard Beardsworth 
and George Collins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 11.
110 Laruelle, A Biography, 5.
111 Ibid., 26.
112 Stiegler, The Age of Disruption, 296.
of behavior by rendering it calculable/predictable (e.g., predic-
tive processing and neuro-inferential Bayesian modeling). Both 
philosophers clearly censure the neolibertarian ethos of techno-
logical intensification, whether political, rhetorical, or technical. 
 Both Stiegler and Laruelle’s projects deal with the intimate dis-
section of unconscious drives. In Laruelle’s case it is finitude that 
renders the drive autonomous, as finitude extracts the drive from 
the unconscious chain, remaining inherent to itself while preserv-
ing the “immediacy of acting.”113 Consequently, we can only trans-
form that which has a form through the continuous penetration of 
activity into raw material; the drive cannot form a body within the 
world, even if it does affect it.114 For Stiegler, this fetish is the result 
of the “unbinding of the drives,” which are properly libidinal: the 
faculty of the drives is the phantasmatic faculty, or that which pro-
tains (anticipates), contained in the form of artefactual technicity.115 
Granted, many of the differences between Laruelle and Stiegler’s 
Marxism are spurred by the non-thetic vantage of non-philoso-
phy’s precluding the Decision. Alternatively, Stiegler’s interest 
in trans-generational flows is determined by a kind of temporal 
unconscious decision-binding between humankind and its dia-
chronic artefactual grammatization. As Laruelle’s description of 
the drive is “non-positional,” or that of “Non-thetic Transcen-
dence,”116 it possesses a certain “correlate” of transcendence. 
However, Stiegler is much more concerned with using the drive 
as a cultural diagnostic. After all, where Laruelle is concerned 
with an ethical system that does not appeal to an Other, or au-
thoritarian vectors, Stiegler is interested in the merge between 
humanity and its technical prostheses - the artefactual point 
of contiguity between noetic activity and “becoming-Other.”
At its most radical dissimilarity, following Laruelle’s non-Marx-
ism, Stiegler’s operation of philosophical conceptuality of noesis 
as arche-cinema does violence upon the real by spatially binding 
it. Furthermore, in Stiegler’s system we see the trace of a kind of 
113 Laruelle, A Biography, 201.
114 Ibid., 202.
115 Stiegler, The Age of Disruption, 82.
116 Ibid., 204.
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resulting “synthesis, fusion, or mixte”117 between transcendence 
and immanence, or exteriority and interiority, which prompts a 
transformation or appropriation. Similarly, this “co-constitution 
of the real in the form of known Being or existence” effective-
ly enacts another kind of “violent alienation of the real from it-
self,”118 repeated in Stiegler’s instrumental treatment of animality.
Thus, in conclusion, Laruelle and Stiegler are not entirely in dis-
agreement though they do occupy varied scalar intensities that can 
be more finely analyzed through the vantage of quantum superpo-
sitioning, the Real and, in Stiegler’s case, synthesis. While compres-
sion and decompression certainly provides us with an interesting 
perspective with which to consider lossage as it is related to phil-
osophical systematization, it seeks to asphyxiate an entire ontolo-
gy within a rather limited straightjacket while denying any mutual 
territory between the two philosophers - for instance, not only do 
both Laruelle and Stiegler unequivocally agree that the drive is per-
formative but they also both problematize notions of the post-hu-
man. However, as post-Laruellians like Kolozova and Ó Maoilear-
ca demonstrate, through Laruelle we may arrive at a more radical 
(non-Marxist) conception of the non-human. Nonetheless, this is 
not to suggest that Stiegler does not offer a Marxian material analy-
sis: in fact, for those seeking pragmatic and enacted ethics, Stiegler 
is one of the foremost living philosophers who consistently sup-
plements his philosophizing with variegated idealist sociopolitical 
projects. In moving forward and contending with our epoch’s most 
pressing issues - existential risk, ecological catastrophe, and the 
growing criticality of animal rights - such philosophers provide us 
with means to generate and portend alternative models that call into 
question the all-subsuming portrait of unbounded posthumanism.
117 James, Techniques of Thought, 30.
118 Ibid.
